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Summary 
Sickness absence has risen over the past years in Norway. An explanation put forward is that a 
tougher labour market represents a health hazard, while a competing hypothesis predicts that loss 
of job security works as a disciplinary device. In this analysis we aim to trace a causal impact of 
organizational turmoil or job insecurity on sickness absence, applying a difference-in-difference 
approach. Utilizing a negative financial shock that hit specific employers and workplaces, we find 
that sickness absence decreased considerably in the following year. The decrease is substantially 
larger among males than among female employees.  
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1. Introduction 
When the United States housing bubble of the early 2000s burst in 2007 its worldwide 
repercussions eventually triggered the financial crisis of 2008–2009. Investors with exposure in 
credit-default swaps tied to US subprime loans faced heavy losses, amplified by financial products 
with high leverage. A somewhat surprising example of such investors was a group of 
municipalities in energy-rich Norway, who turned out to have invested expected future earnings 
from hydroelectric power plants in high-risk financial products. The central government at first 
rejected any bail-outs, and the affected municipalities had to cut running expenses at short notice. 
In the aftermath, the competence of small local governments to operate in financial markets has 
been questioned. The «Terra crisis», after the name of the brokerage house that sold the financial 
products, soon led to fears of job losses and activated public employee unions. 
The financial loss lead to massive negative coverage in national and even international mass 
media such as Financial Times, New York Times and Wall Street Journal (see Figure 1). Several 
sources state that the general reputation of the municipalities involved was severely harmed and 
that their inhabitants felt ashamed. The quote saying «The people in City Hall were naïve and 
they were manipulated» appears to be representative of public opinion at the time (New York 
Times, Dec 2, 2007). The municipalities involved had not adhered to laws and regulations, 
experts from The County Governor»s office concluded in January 2008. Internal investigations 
were launched. By February 2008, three of the Chief Executive leaders had had to leave their jobs 
because of the losses, and two years later, none of them was left in their original positions 
(www.kommunal-rapport.no). 
 
 
Figure 1. The X-axis shows the number of hitss across Norwegian media; printed and/or web-based 
newspapers, periodicals, radio and television. Numbers are counted per month during the years 2006–
2008. The blue line shows hits that include at least one of the names of the employers impacted, without 
further restrictions. The red line shows hits under the restriction that the term «Terra*»should be included 
along with the name of at least one municipality.Source: http://ret-web05.int.retriever.no/services/  
When the news about the loss sprang, it was clear that it would be of considerable magnitude. 
The complexity of the financial product added to the uncertainty. Budget cuts soon became a 
subject in meetings between employee representatives and administrative leaders and articles in 
union member magazines expressed concern for job security and working conditions. To protect 
municipal welfare production, the Government proposed a law change, implemented in June 
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2008, so that municipalities were allowed to cover losses over a longer period, a maximum of ten 
instead of four years (Ot.prp. nr. 53 (2007–2008)). This option was a response to the worry some 
of the municipalities expressed, but utilizing it was unattractive because it implied a loss of 
municipal autonomy in economic matters and more detailed state governance. 
Until revealed by a financial newspaper in late October 2007, the approaching problems were 
not acknowledged at the mayors’ offices. For the common public employee, the crisis came as a 
shock in the true sense of the word (Hofstad, 2008). Thus, the Terra crisis is well suited for a 
case-study of how worker behaviour is affected by employers being exposed to dramatic and 
unexpected events. One aspect of such behaviour is sickness absenteeism. Job-related shocks 
may influence sickness absence by affecting health but also by affecting incentives to report sick. 
Even though institutional arrangements vary, the sickness absence level has been a much-debated 
problem causing worries in several European countries.  
High absence rates cause large production losses and puts public finances under strain. 
Different explanations have been put forward, – for a recent summary of the Norwegian case, 
see Markussen, Røed, Røgeberg and Gaure (2009). A popular explanation is that the labor market 
has become tougher. There is a growing interest in the role of the workplace, with key words 
being downsizing, organizational change, employee turnover and local social norms. However, 
causal relationships are difficult to trace because of selection into education, occupations, 
employment and workplaces. In this analysis we aim to trace a causal impact of organizational 
turmoil on sickness absence, using the financial shock in 2007–2008 to a specific group of local 
governments as a source of exogenous variation. We make no sharp distinction between 
organizational turmoil and job insecurity. As a job is defined by a bundle of attributes, income 
being only one of them, we use the term «job insecurity» in a broader context than simply fear of 
unemployment and income loss. We now proceed by a short review of related literature in the 
next section. Section 3 gives a short account of relevant institutional facts, Section 4 details our 
empirical strategy and Section 5 describes the data. Section 6 presents the econometric results, 
and Section 7 concludes. 
2. Related literature 
Obviously there is a strong health component in sickness absence, but absence is also affected by 
the opportunity cost of reporting sick. There is an empirical economic literature that relates 
absence to economic incentives, such as Allen (1981), Dunn and Youngblood (1986), Kenyon 
and Dawkins (1989), Barmby et al. (1991), Johansson and Palme (2005). Johansson and Palme 
(1996) find that a Swedish reform that made absence more costly for workers reduced sickness 
absence. There are also some studies that relate sickness absence to the unemployment rate 
(Leigh 1985, Arai and Thoursie 2005, Askildsen et al. 2005), where the proposed mechanism is 
that an increased job loss risk works as a disciplining device that reduces the sickness propensity. 
An alternative explanation to the observed countercyclical variation in sickness absence in some 
countries is that labour force composition varies over the cycle as labour demand increases or 
decreases, and that less healthy workers are pushed out of the labour market in downturns. 
However, it is hard to find evidence that composition explains cyclical absence variation (Arai 
and Thoursie 2005, Askildsen et al. 2005). Recently, a growing body of research connects 
sickness absence and other social insurance plans to social norms and attitudes (e.g., Lindbeck et 
al. 1999, Bamberger and Biron. 2007, Rege et al. 2007). A strand of contributions aims to identify 
social interaction effects (Bradley et al., 2006, Hesselius et al. 2009, Lindbeck et al., 2009). One 
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such interaction is ‘learning’ in the sense that workers in the same firm has similar absence 
behaviour. Another is reciprocity between employer and employee: if the employer treats the 
workers well, they may respond by having less absence. Vice versa: worsened conditions for 
workers may induce increased absence to ‘get back at’ the employer. (må ha ref her). 
A negative shock to the employer has similar effects as a rise in the local unemployment rate – 
jobs are perceived as less secure, and adding to the threat of losing the job is firm reorganizations 
that may affect workers. The literature presents two competing hypotheses for analyzing the 
financial trouble of affected Norwegian municipalities in 2007–2008. Both are relevant in a 
situation where employees are worried about the future, whether they think that there is a 
(greater) risk of job loss or worry about an unfavourable change in their job content. The first 
hypothesis claims that less secure jobs will encourage workers to avoid absenteeism. This is 
supported by Arai and Thoursie (2005), Ichino and Riphahn (2005), Lindbeck, Palme and 
Persson (2006), but not supported by Markussen, Røed, Røgeberg and Gaure (2009). On the 
other hand, insecurity and worry caused by reorganization may in itself be a health hazard, as 
indicated in the well-known Whitehall studies (Ferrie, Shipley, Marmot, Stansfeld, Smith, 1995, 
1998a, 1998b). Using register data, Røed and Fevang (2007) find that sickness absence grew 
among Norwegian auxiliary nurses and nurses employed by municipalities who experienced 
downsizing at their unit. The present study differs by exploiting an external shock and not 
focusing on a particular group of workers.  
3. Institutional background 
Norwegian sickness insurance is mandatory and regulated by law, covering all employees who 
have been with the same employer for at least two weeks. Once this requirement is met, coverage 
is 100% from the first day. A medical certificate is necessary for absences lasting more than three 
days. For sickness spells lasting more than eight weeks, the physician is obliged to provide a more 
detailed certificate to the Social Insurance authorities, stating diagnosis and a prognosis 
assessment. The first 16 days are paid by the employer (the employer period), whereas the 
remaining period is paid by social insurance, organized under the National Insurance 
Administration (NAV). The maximum period of benefits is one year, including the employer 
period. NAV expenses are covered jointly by wage earners’ income taxes and employers’ payroll 
taxes. Compared to most other countries, absence rates are high: the last ten years, certified 
sickness absence has been fluctuating around 6–7%, peaking in 2003 at almost 7.5%. Public 
expenditures for the program (not including the employer period) are substantial, about 2.5% of 
GDP. Measures to reduce sickness absence have been on the agenda for several years, but 
suggestions to reduce the replacement ratio or to increase the employer period have proved 
highly controversial. In 2001, the so-called «Including working life» agreement was introduced. 
This agreement, including the government, employers’ and workers’ organizations, aimed to 
reduce sickness absence by 20% from the 2001 level. The agreement did not involve any changes 
in replacement rates but emphasized improving working conditions and better follow-up of sick-
listed workers. In 2011 the absence rate was 5.8%, still above the aim in 2001.  
Norway has a large public sector, with public consumption at almost 30% of GDP. The 
number of public employees is also substantial. About 30% of the workforce is employed in the 
public sector, and more than 2/3 of this share is municipal workers. Worker protection is 
Norway is quite strong; in particular there are regulations against dismissing workers while on 
sick leave.  
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4. Empirical strategy 
Our source of exogenous variation in job security is the financial shock that hit eight Norwegian 
municipalities in the late autumn of 2007. Employees in other municipalities were not affected by 
the shock and may be used as a control group in a natural experiment set-up. We apply a 
standard difference- in-differences (DID) approach. In what follows, we use the standard term 
«treatment» for being exposed to the shock. In its simplest form, DID compares average sickness 
absence in the treated group to the average in the untreated group, before and after an event 
which is exogenous to group assignment. Let Y denote the outcome (sickness absence), and let 
subscripts 0 and 1 denote the pre- and post-treatment periods, respectively. The DID estimator, 
β, of the average treatment effect is then 
 
(1) . 
The idea is that the average change in outcome for the control group is the same as it would have 
been for the treatment group in absence of treatment, under the identifying assumption that 
there is no difference in pre-treatment trends between the groups. With multi-period data, as we 
have, trends may be incorporated in the model. We estimate the DID effect from a regression 
model for individuals i in periods t = 1,…, T. Let FSit be an indicator for working in one of the 
municipalities that were exposed to the financial shock, POSTt a dummy variable which equals 1 
in periods after the shock, and Dt, t = 1,…,T period dummies. The regression equation, 
estimated on quarterly data, is  
 
(2)  
where εit is a random error term, and we have also included quarter dummies Dq to control for 
seasonal variation and a vector Xit of individual characteristics. This model allows for different 
time trends and intercepts for treatments and controls, and the treatment effect, β, is modeled as 
the post-treatment shift in the treatment group trend. Equation (1) is estimated by ordinary least 
squares (OLS) and fixed effects (FE). The FE estimator allows for unobserved individual 
heterogeneity that is time-constant. 
A potential pitfall of this approach is that even though the financial shock was unexpected, 
workers may have self-selected into the «Terra municipalities». We have good counter-arguments: 
first, the control, as well as the treatment group, consists of municipal employees. Thus, possible 
selection into public/private employment on basis of preferences for job security is not an issue. 
Second, the control group is selected from municipalities with similar characteristics as the 
exposed municipalities; see the data section for details. Third, the FE estimator controls for time-
invariant unobserved individual characteristics. For instance, if the affected municipalities were 
known to have particular lax – or strict – practices regarding sickness absence that attracted 
workers with particular attitudes, such unobserved attitudes are differenced out of the model. 
The same argument applies to differences in individual health endowment. 
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5. Data 
The key data source is administrative registers from Statistics Norway which comprise the whole 
population and enable us to link data on employer with data on sickness absence for the same 
individual. First we identify all individuals who held a job in the municipal sector and their 
employer by Dec 31, 2006, about a year prior to the financial shock. In order to purify the 
relation between employer and sickness absence, we exclude individuals who also hold a job 
outside the municipal sector or who have employment in several municipalities of different 
treatment status or in several treated municipalities. Furthermore, employees above the age of 66 
are excluded.  
This data set is merged to the data on sickness absence from The Norwegian Labour and Welfare 
Administration by means of the unique personal identification code. We include only absence 
episodes caused by the employee’s own sickness, i.e., absence due to illness among family 
members is ignored. In order to ease the construction of the data set we exclude individuals with 
a very high number of sickness absence spells. We have information on all sickness absence 
episodes 1992–2008, but for the purpose of this paper sickness absence is measured during 
twelve 3-months periods, i.e., Jan 2006–Dec 2008. This procedure leaves us with a data set of 
336621 individuals, each with 12 observations. For details on sample selection, see table A1. 
The treatment group counts 7985 individuals. Our control group consists of employees within 
municipalities which, like treatment group employers, gain income from hydro-electric energy 
production. These 167 municipalities are located in all regions of the country, within 16 out of 
Norway’s 20 counties. Data on the eight affected municipalities are found in table A2. The 
municipalities differ in a number of respects: 1–4 are located within the same county in Northern 
Norway, whereas 5–8 are situated in Southern or Western Norway, see figure 2. 
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Figure 2. The location of the eight municipalities impacted 
Municipalities 1, 4 and 5 are middle-sized towns by Norwegian standards, whereas the rest are 
thinly settled. The one thing they have in common, is that they invested heavily in complicated 
financial products. These investments were made possible by their expected income from hydro-
electric energy production. Municipalities who have a share in this natural resource are typically 
affluent. Still, their level of gross expenditure in 2006 varied substantially with size, as can be seen 
from table A2. 
We estimate two outcomes: i) the number of days of certified sickness absence per quarter of 
a year and ii) a dummy variable indicating at least one absence spell in a given period (named 
«incidence» in the tables). Certified sickness absence excludes the initial 16 days of each spell that 
is covered by the employer. Our results may therefore be interpreted as «lower bounds» of the 
full effect on the incidence of sickness absence and the number of sick days. 
The pre- and post-shock periods are defined, respectively, as Q1, 2006 – Q4, 2007 and Q1-
Q4, 2008. Media reports on the financial losses commenced in October–November 2007 but it 
seems reasonable that potential effects on absence level would be observed no sooner than the 
next quarter.  
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Table 1A Descriptive statistics 
control group impacted by shock 
pre shock post shock pre shock post shock 
days of sickness absence 5.869 6.305 6.625 6.639 
incidence of sickness absence 0.070 0.068 0.086 0.080 
1 if same employer 1 Jan 2006–31 Dec 2008, otherwise 0 0.724 0.787 0.699 0.771 
1 if female 0.798 0.802 0.789 0.795 
year of birth 1960.6 1960.6 1961.4 1961.4 
1 if information on education is missing 0.020 0.017 0.018 0.015 
1 if 10 years of schooling or less 0.103 0.103 0.103 0.102 
1 if 11–13 years of schooling 0.443 0.448 0.441 0.443 
1 if 14–16 years of schooling 0.214 0.212 0.215 0.215 
1 if 17 years of education or more 0.221 0.220 0.223 0.225 
number of children less than 15 years of age by period t 0.701 0.689 0.720 0.719 
1 if never married by period t, otherwise 0 0.251 0.236 0.268 0.251 
1 if married by period t, otherwise 0 0.607 0.615 0.579 0.589 
1 if separated, divorced or widowed by period t, otherwise 0 0.143 0.149 0.153 0.160 
1 if no sickness absence spells 1992–2008 0.191 0.193 0.165 0.163 
No. of sickness absence spells 1992–2008  3.648 3.613 4.202 4.173 
n 507647 233491 56808 25728 
change in days post/pre shock 0.435 0.013 
difference in change in days, impacted vs control group  -0.422 
change of incidence post/pre shock -0.001 -0.006 
difference in change of incidence, impacted vs control group -0.004 
Notes: «Pre shock» is periods within the years 2006 and 2007, while «post shock» is 2008. 
Table 1B Descriptive statistics by gender 
Men Women 
control group impacted control group impacted  
pre  post pre post pre post pre  post 
days of sickness absence 3.695 3.935 4.353 3.678 6.421 6.891 7.234 7.403 
incidence of sickness absence 0.043 0.042 0.056 0.047 0.076 0.075 0.094 0.089 
1 if same employer 1 Jan 2006–31 Dec 
2008, otherwise 0 0.737 0.818 0.712 0.810 0.721 0.779 0.695 0.762 
1 if female 
year of birth 1958.8 1958.9 1960.2 1960.1 1961.0 1961.0 1961.8 1961.7 
1 if information on education is missing 0.022 0.017 0.018 0.015 0.019 0.017 0.018 0.016 
1 if 10 years of schooling or less 0.085 0.086 0.086 0.083 0.108 0.107 0.108 0.107 
1 if 11–13 years of schooling 0.336 0.339 0.361 0.357 0.470 0.475 0.462 0.465 
1 if 14–16 years of schooling 0.210 0.207 0.196 0.202 0.215 0.213 0.220 0.218 
1 if 17 years of education or more 0.348 0.350 0.339 0.343 0.188 0.187 0.192 0.194 
number of children less than 15 years of age 
by period t 0.658 0.656 0.684 0.683 0.712 0.697 0.729 0.729 
1 if never married by period t, otherwise 0 0.263 0.245 0.307 0.280 0.248 0.233 0.257 0.244 
1 if married by period t, otherwise 0 0.626 0.637 0.568 0.589 0.602 0.610 0.582 0.588 
1 if separated, divorced or widowed by 
period t, otherwise 0 0.111 0.118 0.125 0.131 0.151 0.157 0.161 0.168 
1 if no sickness absence spells 1992–2008 0.333 0.335 0.303 0.298 0.155 0.158 0.128 0.128 
No. of sickness absence spells 1992–2008  2.275 2.259 2.711 2.689 3.996 3.947 4.601 4.555 
n 102780 46321 11995 5277 404867 187170 44813 20451 
change in days post/pre shock 0.240 -0.675 0.470 0.169 
difference in change in days, impacted vs 
control group  -0.915 -0.301 
change of incidence post/pre shock -0.001 -0.009 -0.002 -0.005 
difference in change of incidence, impacted 
vs control group  -0.008 -0.004 
  12
Tables 1A and 1B show descriptive statistics for the treatment and control groups, 
before and after the financial shock. We note that the groups are similar w.r.t. age, 
education and family characteristics. However, there appears to be quite a difference in 
the change in sickness absence from before to after the financial shock: -0,442 days per 
quarter of year, i.e., 7–8 % of an average absence of about 6 days per quarter of year. 
The difference in incidence is of the same order. These are simple DID estimates 
according to equation (1). The gender-wise calculations in Table 1B indicate that the 
absence level is notably higher for women, but the change is largest for men. 
Figure 3 Sickness absence 2006–2008. Mean days 
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Figure 4 Sickness absence 2006–2008. Mean incidence 
Figure 3 shows seasonally adjusted absence days in the observation period by gender 
and group. For both gender, absence decreased through 2008, but apparently more in 
the affected municipalities. Average incidence, displayed in Figure 4, reveals a similar 
tendency for women. For men the picture is less clear: in the treatment group incidence 
was reduced in the beginning of 2008 but then increased, while there is no clear trend in 
the control group.  
The main impression this far is that sickness absence was reduced in the affected 
municipalities, but most clearly for men and more distinctly for absence days than for 
incidence. In the next section we investigate whether this impression holds in an 
econometric analysis with control variables. 
6. Estimation results. 
Equation (2) was estimated by OLS and individual fixed effects (FE) for both outcomes 
(absence days and incidence). In the OLS regressions we control for age, education, 
marital status, and number of children, in addition to quarter of year and time period. In 
FE regressions most of the controls are excluded because they do not vary over time
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Table 2 Effect on days of sickness absence 
 MEN WOMEN 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treat -1.021** -0.994*** -0.513** -0.740*** 
 (-2.31) (-2.80) (-2.19) (-3.37) 
Terrajob 0.706 . 0.715 . 
 (0.81) . (0.96) . 
2.quarter of year 0.319*** 0.351*** 1.691*** 0.279*** 
 (3.21) (3.55) (9.61) (3.30) 
3.quarter of year 0.021 1.054*** -0.968*** -0.904*** 
 (0.12) (5.15) (-8.73) (-8.17) 
4.quarter of year 0.353* 1.486*** 1.181*** 2.160*** 
 (1.68) (7.19) (7.33) (13.23) 
Background variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for period 
Terra-specific trend 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Individual fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
 
Columns labelled (1) and (2) show results from OLS and the fixed-effects estimator, respectively. 
Standard errors are robust to heteroskedasticity and clustered at the employer level. Background 
variables include education, a polynominal of age, marital status, and number of children.  
 
The post-shock effect is statistically significant and larger for men than for women, as 
expected from the descriptive statistics. The FE estimates are -0.99 and -0.74 for men 
and women, respectively. This is more than the simple estimates in Table 1B, in 
particular for women. For women, the FE estimate is also clearly larger than the OLS 
estimate. In general, we put more confidence in FE because it controls for unobserved 
heterogeneity. Sickness absence may be affected by, e.g., health and attitudes, and the 
case for the FE estimator seems particularly strong. The standard tests also favour FE. 
The relative changes are substantial: 10% for women and 23% for men as compared to 
the average pre-shock levels.  
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Table 3 Effect on incidence of sickness absence 
 MEN WOMEN 
 (1) (2) (1) (2) 
Treat -0.012** -0.011** -0.006 -0.007 
 (-2.20) (-2.22) (-0.71) (-0.78) 
Terrajob 0.010 . 0.016*** . 
 (1.45) . (3.02) . 
2.quarter of year -0.006*** -0.006** -0.007*** -0.013*** 
 (-2.70) (-2.59) (-4.17) (-7.70) 
3.quarter of year -0.007*** -0.008*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (-3.13) (-3.15) (-13.41) (-13.44) 
4.quarter of year -0.003 0.003 0.008*** 0.013*** 
 (-1.08) (1.33) (4.03) (6.27) 
Background variables Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Dummies for period 
Terra-specific trend 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes  
Yes 
Yes 
Individual fixed effect No Yes No Yes 
 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. 
See notes to table 2 
 
As «incidence» is a discrete outcome, the coefficients are interpreted as marginal effects 
on the probability of absence. Here, the estimated effect is statistically significant only 
for men, 0.011 or 1.1 percentage points with FE. Again, the effect is considerable, 
implying a 20% reduction from about 0.05. The point estimate for women is larger than 
the according number in Table 1B but far from any acceptable level of statistical 
significance.  
The evidence this far is quite clear that the length of absence spells was reduced by 
the shock, less clear that the probability of absence was affected. This is reasonable. We 
analyze sickness spells that last two weeks or more and reducing the duration is a 
smaller adjustment than skipping the sickness episode altogether. The gender 
differences are interesting. It is well known that women’s sickness absence levels are 
higher than men’s and they also appear less elastic to organizational shocks. However, 
we cannot infer whether this is due to different job characteristics, health differences or 
different attitudes.  
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Table 4 Placebo shock 
 Post shock periods are 5–8 Post shock periods are 5–12 
 Men Women Men Women 
 OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE OLS FE 
a) Days of absence: 
treat_58 -0.113 -0.106 -0.405 -0.318     
 (-0.22) (-0.22) (-1.23) (-1.18)     
treat_512     0.712 0.678 0.335 0.581** 
     (0.87) (0.99) (1.32) (2.15) 
b) Incidence:         
treat_58 0.004 0.002 -0.006 -0.006     
 (0.40) (0.17) (-0.88) (-0.90)     
treat_512     0.008 0.006 0.002 0.003 
     (0.81) (0.65) (0.66) (0.79) 
Shock attributed to period 4, post shock period is periods 5-8 or 5-12. 
t statistics in parentheses. * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
As a check for robustness, table 4 shows results for regressions were we have redefined 
the POST-dummy to equal one .from Q1, 2007 onwards. This is almost one year before 
the crisis, and there were no other particular other events that should have affected 
sickness absence systematically. Thus, if this placebo treatment turns out to have any 
effect, it leads us to suspect that the effects revealed in tables 2 and 3 are spurious. In 
the left panel of Table 4 we include only observations for Q1, 2006–Q4, 2007. There is 
no effect of the placebo treatment on either outcome. In the right panel we also include 
2008; the treatment dummy equals one in 2007 and 2008. All coefficients but one are 
insignificant in this case, too. One should note that the placebo in the right panel is 
different from the other in the sense that also observations from the true post-shock 
period are included. The overall impression from the placebo regressions is to increase 
our confidence in the actual results in tables 2 and 3.  
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Table 5 Omitting municipalities 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
a) Days of absence:        
Men:         
treat, OLS -1.154*** -1.193** -1.092** -1.057** -1.175** -1.011** -0.762* -0.711 
 (-2.61) (-2.28) (-2.43) (-2.32) (-2.30) (-2.24) (-1.88) (-1.55) 
treat, FE -1.105*** -1.127*** -1.049*** -1.047*** -1.029** -0.994*** -0.748** -0.846** 
 (-3.13) (-2.71) (-2.90) (-2.89) (-2.40) (-2.74) (-2.52) (-1.98) 
Women:         
treat, OLS -0.490** -0.687*** -0.483** -0.509** -0.615** -0.539** -0.382** -0.460* 
 (-2.00) (-2.76) (-2.04) (-2.08) (-2.37) (-2.25) (-2.00) (-1.71) 
treat, FE -0.726*** -0.921*** -0.721*** -0.752*** -0.769*** -0.752*** -0.629*** -0.685*** 
 (-3.16) (-4.51) (-3.23) (-3.27) (-2.96) (-3.36) (-3.32) (-2.75) 
b) Incidence:          
Men:         
treat, OLS -0.014*** -0.011 -0.013** -0.012** -0.015*** -0.012** -0.011* -0.007 
 (-2.74) (-1.57) (-2.48) (-2.11) (-2.71) (-2.16) (-1.84) (-1.34) 
treat, FE -0.013*** -0.009 -0.012** -0.011** -0.013*** -0.011** -0.010* -0.007 
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 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
 (-2.91) (-1.46) (-2.53) (-2.21) (-2.71) (-2.17) (-1.85) (-1.30) 
Women:         
treat, OLS -0.008 -0.014** -0.007 -0.005 -0.002 -0.007 -0.006 0.000 
 (-0.90) (-2.15) (-0.75) (-0.61) (-0.20) (-0.78) (-0.65) (0.04) 
treat -0.009 -0.014** -0.007 -0.006 -0.002 -0.007 -0.007 -0.000 
 (-1.00) (-2.06) (-0.81) (-0.70) (-0.23) (-0.83) (-0.74) (-0.00) 
Municipality excluded: 1037 1106 1417 1438 1805 1826 1832 1833 
 Kvinesdal Haugesund Vik Bremanger Narvik Hattfjelldal Hemnes Rana 
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As seen in Table A2, the affected municipalities vary in size from Haugesund (32 302 
inhabitants) to Hattfjelldal (1482 inhabitants). Thus the results may be sensitive to 
inclusion/exclusion of some municipalities. To check this, we have re-estimated the 
models, omitting one affected municipality at a time. The results are depicted in Table 5. 
Compared to the main results in table 2 and 3, the reduced samples produce quite 
similar results for absence days and incidence as well, the exception being that excluding 
the second-largest municipality, Rana (column 8), makes the effect on incidence 
insignificant but still negative.  
Figure 5. Change in employment status 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
In each period, we only include in the estimated sample workers who remain with the 
employer that they had one year prior to the shock. It could be the case that the 
negative effect of the shock is driven by high-absence workers shifting employer or 
leaving the labour force. However, figure 5 shows that the proportion of employees 
who left their employer temporarily or permanently is very similar in the treatment and 
control group, there are no sharp shifts in trends. A potential reaction to perceived 
increased job insecurity could be to look for other jobs, but figure 5 does not support 
that hypothesis. Furthermore, when estimating a stable-workers sample (consisting only 
of workers who stayed throughout the whole sample period) we get very similar results 
to those in tables 2 and 3 (not reported). Thus, the drop in absence is driven by workers 
who stay with the same employer and cannot be explained by changes in the 
composition of workers. 
When estimating a stable-workers sample (consisting only of workers who stayed 
throughout the whole sample period) we get very similar results to those in tables 2 and 
3 (not reported). Thus, the drop in absence is driven by workers who stay with the same 
employer and cannot be explained by changes in the composition of workers. 
Our main conclusion is that the financial shock reduced sickness absence among 
employees in the municipalities that were affected, that the effect was stronger for men 
than for women, and clearer for the length than the incidence of absence. The placebo 
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exercise gives evidence against the effect being a time trend, and the conclusion also is 
robust to omitting municipalities or workers who changed job. 
7. Concluding remarks 
The financial shock that hit some Norwegian municipalities in 2007–2008 might affect 
sickness absence of public employees through several channels. Previous research 
suggests some main hypotheses. First, the crisis could have a direct health effect. In that 
case, we would expect sickness absence to increase in line with the Whitehall studies – it 
is hard to imagine a positive health effect. To the contrary, we find that sickness absence 
decreased. Second, the reciprocity hypothesis also implies increased absence: in 
response to the irresponsible behaviour of employers (the «Terra municipalities”) 
workers would feel less compelled to hold back on absence. Again, the fact that absence 
was actually reduced falsifies hypotheses that imply increased absence. Third, the 
prospect of jobs becoming less secure could have a disciplining effect leading to less 
absence. Our results are consistent with this hypothesis and also agrees with previous 
research concluding that less secure job environments reduce sickness absence, whether 
insecurity is brought about by rising unemployment rates (Arai and Thoursie, 2005), 
probation (Ichino and Riphahn, 2005) or softening of job security legislation (Lindbeck 
et al., 2006). A fourth hypothesis is that reduced absence is brought about by changes in 
the composition of workers. However, that is not supported by the observed turnover 
rates. 
In our analysis, the data is at individual level whereas the negative shock came at the 
employer level and the mechanism is not quite clear. The bad news became publicly 
known in October-November 2007. Media coverage was extensive, and a statement in 
November from the leader of the largest public employee union that cuts must not be at 
the cost of workers, indicates that there was a fear of such cuts. We find that sickness 
absence dropped from the first quarter of 2008, but we have no evidence that the 
number of jobs was reduced at that time. However, it seems probable that the 
possibility of less secure jobs may have had a disciplining effect that led to reduced 
sickness absence. Thus it is the expectation of future downsizing that may have induced 
less absence, not downsizing itself. It should also be noted that what we have found 
must be termed a short run effect. The post shock period is too short to test for long 
run effects; moreover it is most likely that the effect of an expected reduction in job 
security is temporary. Our results are not necessarily at odds with Røed and Fevang 
(2007) who found that actual downsizing increased absence among Norwegian nurses. 
A possible mechanism is that the threat of future downscaling gives workers incentives 
to reduce absence in the short run, but that prolonged insecurity has negative health 
effects that dominate in the longer run. 
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Table A1 Sample selection 
 
No. of individuals 
Employed in municipal sector by Dec 31 2006 370834 
Dropped because employed in several municipalities with different treatment status -2787 
Dropped because employed in several treated municipalities -3 
Dropped because of age>66 in 2006 -744 
Dropped because reason for sickness absence registered is something else than 
employee’s own sickness -5427 
Dropped because is outlier, > 20 sickness absence episodes 1992–31.12.2008 -1919 
Dropped because employed both within and outside of municipal sector -22889 
Dropped for other reasons  -444 
Data set for analysis 336621 
From this data set we extract: 
Treatment group: employees impacted by shock 7985 
Control group: employees of other municipalities that own hydro-electric power  69951 
 
Table A2 Municipalities affected by the financial shock 
 Municipality  No. of inhab, Dec 2006 Gross exp.per capita, 2006   
 1805 Narvik 18301 53506  
2 1826 Hattfjelldal 1482 70906  
3 1832 Hemnes 4510 66422  
4 1833 Rana 25190 46989  
5 1037 Kvinesdal 5595 58501  
6 1106 Haugesund 32303 45306  
7 1417 Vik  2835 64109  
8 1438 Bremanger 3930 62759  
 
